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This paper examines how New Yorkers reshaped the public sphere as they engaged in a 
series of self-organized, loosely coordinated efforts to collectively make sense of the 
challenges they faced in responding and recovering from the attack of 9/11.  We explore 
how technologies of deliberation, representation, and demonstration were mobilized to 
widen the scope and diversify the organizational strategies enabling public participation.  
Drawing on Dewey's philosophy of pragmatism and the social studies of science, we 
focus on how disparate socio-technologies of assembly offered different affordances that 
both enabled and inhibited particular discursive practices and forms of collective 
inquiry. 
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| 1 | THE PRACTICAL CHALLENGE 
 
s they recovered from the immediate shock and devastation of the September 11th 
attack, the citizens of New York and their elected representatives were confronted 
by the daunting challenge of deciding the future of the World Trade Center 
(WTC) site.  So much had been destroyed: Thousands had perished. Tens of thousands 
had been displaced from their jobs. Tens of millions of square feet of office space had 
been destroyed or damaged.  Critical infrastructure hubs in transportation, 
telecommunications, and electricity had been devastated; large corporations forced to 
relocate; small retail, hotel, and restaurant businesses crippled; students, employees, and 
local residents displaced and traumatized. The meaning and identity of Lower 
Manhattan as a financial district was now uncertain, and a city whose dynamism was in 
large part as a global crossroads was now a place of insecurity.  It was clear that 
redevelopment of the site would be one of the most significant undertakings in the city’s 
history.   
 
As they rose to meet these material and emotional challenges, New Yorkers were 
confronted by social and political challenges no less daunting. There were so many 
stakeholders with so many disparate claims:  The families of victims had claims for 
compensation and moral claims about the status of “hallowed ground.”  The Port 
Authority, as the owner of the land, faced claims from its bondholders.  The leaseholders 
of the properties, with claims from their creditors, placed claims on their insurers. 
Companies filed claims for compensation. And all of these business entities pressed their 
interests on various governmental units and agencies whose multiple and overlapping 
jurisdictions compounded the complexity of the decision-making process.  Meanwhile 
residents, schools, religious and cultural institutions in the adjacent neighborhoods 
claimed a role in the redevelopment process, acknowledging the legitimacy of the claims 
of the victims’ families but questioning proposals for a 16 acre memorial (“we don’t 
want to live next to a cemetery”). Others pointed to studies showing that the economic 
and psychological impact of the attack was greater in neighborhoods distant from 
ground zero and argued that funds for redevelopment should be spent citywide.  Some 
housing developers pointed to high vacancy rates among existing office space in Lower 
Manhattan and argued for new residential construction.  Low-income groups argued 
that it should be affordable housing.  Others argued for another kind of diversity that 
would bring universities, museums, and an opera house to the site.  Environmentalists 
argued that the site should be a model of sustainable “green” development.  Taxpayer 
groups argued that the properties should be developed with an eye to improved fiscal 
revenues.  Architects pressed for impressive buildings, arguing that not only New 
Yorkers but all people touched by the event needed monuments as imaginative as the 
immensity of the tragedy.  In turn, urban planners denounced the architects for 
proposals in which design leads the program instead of the program leading the design.  
 
On one principle the various stakeholders agreed: redevelopment of the WTC needed to 
be an open and participatory process. The answer to the attack on our democracy could 
only be more democracy.   Exemplary, in this respect, is the following passage from the 




“On October 1, 2001 more than 75 civic leaders gathered in an overcrowded 
conference room to begin a process so daunting we hardly knew where to start.  
The yet-to-be-named Civic Alliance to Rebuild Downtown New York had many 
different ideas on how to rebuild, but were united behind one goal – to transcend 
business-as-usual in support of an open, inclusive rebuilding process that would 
stand as a monument to democracy.”   
 
If all the participants agreed that the process must be democratic, there was little 
common understanding of what “an open, inclusive rebuilding process” might be.  
There are multiple notions of democracy, multiple principles of representation, and 
multiple notions of public good.  The citizens of New York, their elected and appointed 
officials, and their civic associations (many of which emerged after September 11th) did 
not wait to come to an agreement about the rules and procedures for a democratic 
process.  Faced with a situation unprecedented in its urgency and its challenges, each 
began to act congruent with its notions of democracy, representation, and participation.  
It is amidst and through this extraordinary heterogeneity that New Yorkers engaged in a 
collective exploration. 
 
Because the process of reconstruction would be as important as the product, rebuilding 
the physical space of Lower Manhattan launched a reshaping of the space of the public 
sphere.  In the wake of September 11,th small-scale public forums proliferated and were 
soon followed by more systematic efforts on the part of governmental agencies and 
leading civic groups to solicit input from the public about the design of an appropriate 
memorial and the future of the World Trade Center site. These public forums used very 
different technologies of deliberation—from ideas recorded on butcher block paper, to 
polling via personal touchtone keypads, to threaded online discussions, to websites and 
digital demonstrations.  They offer a remarkable opportunity to examine technologies of 
citizen participation in governance when the reshaping of the public sphere occurs in an 
era when the forms of representation (in multiple senses of the term) are themselves co-
evolving with new digital technologies.   
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| 2 | THE ANALYTICAL CHALLENGE 
 
t mid-century, organizational analysts at Columbia University led by Robert 
Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld launched two ambitious research programs.  On one 
track, Merton and his graduate students Peter Blau, Alvin Gouldner, and James 
Coleman examined the origins and functioning of bureaucracy using a rich repertoire of 
methods including small group analysis, ethnography, and survey research (Merton 
1952).  On the second, parallel track Merton and Lazarsfeld established the Bureau of 
Radio Research to examine the dynamics of mass communication (Lazersfeld and Field 
1946).  Methodological pioneers, they developed the focus group method and used 
projection booths to study the demographics of audience reception well before their 
colleagues in comparative literature discovered “reception theory.”   
 
Whereas our Columbia predecessors charted the rise of bureaucratic organizations and 
the emergence of mass communication, we have a new opportunity, at our century’s 
turn, to chart the emergence of collaborative, non-hierarchical forms in an era of interactive 
media (Girard and Stark 2002; Dorf and Sabel 1998; Beunza and Stark 2004). But the 
analogy holds only to a point: if Merton and Lazarsfeld could pursue their twinned 
projects in parallel, ours must be conjoined in an era when questions of organizational 
design are closely related to design of the digital interface.  We take up that challenge in 
this research project as we seek to develop concepts to study the changing topography of 
public space in a highly visible test of the potential of new technologies of deliberation 
and demonstration. 
 
Search as inquiry 
If the era of Merton and Lazarsfeld was characterized by mass production in the field of 
the economy and mass media in the field of communication, mass movements typified 
the field of demonstration in the public sphere. While mass production, mass media, 
and mass movements remain important forms, the social forms that define our epoch, 
we believe, are more likely to be collaborative production, collaborative (interactive) 
media, and movements of collaborative search.  Large social movements – for peace, 
justice, equality – are necessarily still on the political landscape.  But today the space of 
public debate is as much a place of movement, of churn and heterogeneous turnings, as 
of movements.   Fragmented and partial from the older point of view, this multi-vocality 
borders on the cacophonous.  But this heterogeneity can be its strength.  As knowledge 
is socially distributed in less hierarchical forms, the old boundaries between lay and 
expert, for example, begin to dissipate (Rabeharisoa and Callon 2002; Callon, 
Lascoume, and Barthe 2001). When the tools of representation (as mediated images) 
become interactive, the task of representation (as who can speak for whom) can be re-
imagined.  In an era when policy decisions involve complex technical questions, 
demonstrations are more likely to marshal charts, figures, models, and simulations than 
to mobilize popular movements in the street (Barry 2001).  Alongside protest, public 
space is a zone of inquiry.     
 
The field of information technology is rightly preoccupied with the problem of search.   
How can users find the information they are looking for?  How can organizations locate 
knowledge that is distributed across departments and projects?  How can citizens access 
A 
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relevant information across government agencies and civic associations? New 
technologies of search engines and knowledge management offer promising solutions, 
frequently combining semantic categories with new, network-based algorithms.  
However, we see the problem facing citizens and civic associations in New York as 
involving a distinctive type of search – a search when you don’t know what you’re 
looking for but will recognize it when you find it.   
 
Unlike those searches that yield the coordinates of a known target or retrieve a phone 
number, product code, or document locator for a pre-identified entity or category, and 
unlike official inquiries (e.g., the Kennedy assassination, the Los Angeles riots, the 
Challenger disaster) that investigate a given calamity that occurred in the past, this form 
of search as inquiry is open-ended.  In New York this inquiry was collective, it was 
distributed non-hierarchically across many hundreds of organizations, meetings, and 
sites, and it involved a combination of deliberately directed action and spontaneously 
emergent self-organization.  In these characteristics of distributed intelligence in open-
ended inquiry, it resembles the practices of scientific research.   In examining a collective 
sense-making, we start from the key insight of John Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism 
that we can come to know the question only in the process of making active steps 
toward solutions (Dewey 1927/1991, 1939/1993, 1998; Dorf and Sabel 1998). Search, 
when you don’t know what you’re looking for. 
 
Dewey is our necessary point of departure not only because he thought systematically 
about inquiry1 but also because he explicitly linked these ideas to the study of democratic 
practices and communication technologies.  For Dewey, individuals in daily life must 
negotiate the constant churn of unanticipated consequences, changed circumstances, 
and shifting social and physical contexts.  This daily work of sense-making often requires 
an adjustment, revision, or even transformation of received interpretive tools before new 
challenges can be recognized and addressed.  The sustained inquiry that transforms 
uncertainty into manageable order cultivates a common human capacity for intelligent 
judgment that requires, in order to be fully realized, the give and take of free and open 
social discussion, debate, and deliberation.   
 
Dewey despaired that the American public had lost its ability to meaningfully participate 
in democratic politics; and he attributed this loss primarily to the modern technologies 
of communication and circulation that undermined local affiliation and the daily 
exchanges of face-to-face community.  Although increased mobility and mass media 
supported the dissemination of ideas and information across a dispersed population, it 
transformed the public into a passive receptacle of already formed ideas and opinions.  
But in continuing to assert that “democracy is belief in the ability of human experience 
to generate the aims and methods by which further experience will grow in ordered 
richness,” (Dewey 1939/93: 244) Dewey’s vision of democratic participation required 
that individuals actively take part in making sense of their experience and that this, in 
turn, required a collaborative sense-making possible only through the give and take of 
face-to-face dialogue directed towards understanding “things as they are” and how they 
                                                 
1 For useful introductions to these ideas see the essays, “The Pattern of Inquiry,” “Analysis of 
Reflective Thinking,” and “The Place of Judgment in Reflective Activity,” collected in Dewey 
(1998).     
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might be reconfigured. In their calls that the process would be as important a 
monument as the outcome, the civic activists in New York echoed Dewey’s conviction 
that “democracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any 
special result attained, so that special results achieved are of ultimate value only as they 
are used to enrich and order the ongoing process” (Dewey 1939/93: 244).  The question 
relevant to this volume, of course, is whether and how new interactive technologies 
might facilitate this process where the technologies of mass communication had failed.     
 
Project ecologies and digital ecologies 
In examining non-bureaucratic forms, one of the key insights of the sociology of 
collaborative production is that the actual unit of organization is frequently less a formal 
organization than a project.  Although producers are employed by organizations, they 
increasingly work in projects.  Across a wide range of industries – film, construction, new 
media, automobiles, aeronautics, architecture, publishing, biotechnology, and many 
others – specialists from diverse fields (many of whom had not worked together before 
and, not uncommonly, who are employed by different organizations) collaborate in a 
project of limited duration (Grabher 2002a, 2002b; Sydow, Lindkwvist, and DeFillippi 
2005). 
 
The rebuilding of Lower Manhattan is such a construction project, not only because the 
16 acres of Ground Zero has literally been a site of recovery, then cleanup, and now 
construction, but also because the social construction of the rebuilding process has been 
a vast project similar, though not in scale, to project organization in the economy. The 
Lower Manhattan project is of limited duration involving many specializations and non-
specializations. Or, perhaps more accurately, we should think of a project ecology, 
involving hundreds, perhaps thousands, of smaller projects.  With the exception of 
several dozens of government employees, almost no one is involved in these projects on a 
full-time basis.  Citizens, professionals and non-professionals, assemble temporarily, 
sometimes forming named groupings (for example, civic associations that sprang up, 
lasting weeks, months, or less frequently years).  But many of these micro projects could 
be a single meeting.     
  
Although, as we shall see, some of these assemblies can involve thousands of participants, 
the typical citizen assembly is not some grand popular parliament.  Most are modest – 
the residents, employers, and workers of a mixed residential-commercial block in 
Chinatown, for example, or a team of citizen-architects, hastily-assembled over a 
weekend like a pick-up softball game.  Many assemblies are face-to-face; some are almost 
exclusively online.  Our research indicates, however, that many public assemblies involve 
a mix of physical and virtual forms. From a face-to-face meeting, announced by 
photocopied posters affixed to the bulletin boards of local schools, groceries, and beauty 
shops, someone produces minutes that are disseminated by email and posted on a 
website with links later pointing to it from another site.  Assemblies are recombinant 
technologies of masking tape and digital servers.  Accordingly, in place of studying new 
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digital technologies per se, or engaging in yet another comparison of online and offline 
forms,2 like the concept of project ecologies, we attend to digital ecologies.      
 
Socio-technologies of assembly 
In place of “the public” we think about public spaces of collective sense-making.  Public 
space is not a sphere and it is not homogeneous.  But this is not simply because some 
have more resources or more room.  Public space is not a flat land on which are already 
drawn the unequal territories of already-known interests or constituencies.  Instead, it is 
a heterogeneous space, populated by very different kinds of actors who come into being 
and through their interactions create the many dimensions of the space itself (Mische 
and White 1998).  
 
Therefore, in place of “the public” we think about variation in the forms of pubic 
assembly.  Emphatically, however, assemblies are not populated simply by persons.  
Borrowing from John Dewey directly and indirectly through his influence on science 
and technology studies, we develop a notion of publics as distinctive combinations of 
social networks, protocols, and technologies (Dewey 1927; Latour and Weibel 2005). 
There is no public, no public assembly, without protocols and technologies – even if 
these are as simple as chairs around a table and everyday conventions of conversational 
turn-taking.  Other assemblies are more complex.  The key technologies of a public 
hearing, for example, are a microphone and a stopwatch, with protocols of the socially 
constructed agents who can speak (e.g., can a recognized speaker address the assembly as 
a “representative” or only as an individual citizen?) and for how long (e.g.“We are 
adopting a strict three minute rule”), as well as rules about who cannot speak (e.g. the 
authorities present at the dais are authorized only to listen and must refrain from 
interjecting or responding).  
 
Attention to variation in the socio-technologies of assembly bears directly on our 
conception of sense-making as socially-distributed search. For many, the statement that 
“cognition is socially distributed” would likely be interpreted to refer to a process 
whereby cognition is distributed across a network of persons.  These common sense 
assumptions are reinforced by the strong tendency of sociological network analysts to 
focus almost exclusively on ties between people. But recent scholarship on distributed 
cognition (e.g., Hutchins 1995) suggests that we need to bring not only people but also 
cultural and material artifacts into our network analysis.  Doing so expands and enriches 
our conception of “the social.”  Cognition is socially distributed across persons and 
tools.3  As Roy Pea writes in a study of distributed intelligence in the field of education 
(drawing on Vygotsky, Simon, and especially on Gibson’s (1979) notion of 
“affordances,”): [M]ind rarely works alone.  The intelligence revealed through these 
                                                 
2 In place of the debate about online versus offline forms our observations in New York lead us 
to think about actual organizational forms that recombine virtual and conventional modalities 
(see Woolgar 2002, and Barney 2004).   
3 In a study of an abitrage trading room, Beunza and Stark (2004), for example, show how 
calculation is not a function of the solitary trader but is socially distributed across persons, desks, 
mathmetical models, visualization techniques, automated algorithms, and other 
instrumentation.  See Callon and Muniesa (2005) for a more general discussion of calculation.  
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practices is distributed – across minds, persons, and the symbolic and physical 
environments, both natural and artificial” (Pea 1993: 47). To study collective sense-
making in the the case of issues of public concern, it follows that we are attentive to the 
instrumentation and infrastructure of deliberation. Different arrangements will provide 
different affordances – with differing opportunities and constraints.  Socio-technologies 
of assembly are not simply settings, they are set-ups. 
 
Assemblies will differ in the affordances they offer for different kinds of discursive 
practices.4  Much of the literature on the public sphere has focused on a specific type of 
discourse – deliberation – to the expense of neglecting forms of participation that do not 
share its premises of rational and contained talk.5   In an insightful essay, Sanders (1997) 
argues for other modes of giving input that do not have the exclusionary biases of 
deliberation:   
 
“[F]or example ‘testimony’… might be a model that allows for the expression of 
different perspectives rather than seeking what’s common.  The contrast between the 
pursuit of commonality, and the simpler aim to include and represent a fuller range 
of critical voices, is at the core of the difference between deliberation and testimony” 
(Sanders 1997:371) 
 
In the following sections, we point to several socio-technologies of assembly in the 
Lower Manhattan project.  As moments of collaborative inquiry, we start with “sensing” 
(e.g., gathering, collecting, sampling), turn to “sense-making” (articulating, contrasting, 
discussing, re-cognizing), and conclude with “demonstrating” (showing, confronting, 
constituting).       
 
                                                 
4 Our emphasis here on the the networks, protocols, and technologies should not imply that 
participation happens just by assemblying people in a forum.  As Agre (2004) argues, 
performance requires a set of skills – making associations, building issues, and forging alliances, 
for example.    
5  Burkhalter, Gastil and Kelshaw (2002: 405) offers an instructive summary, “In sum, 
deliberative groups build a strong information base, consider a range of solutions, establish 
representative evaluative criteria, and apply those criteria equally to all solutions.” Sanders 
(1997:370) argues against deliberation as necessarily exemplary:  “Deliberation  is a request for a 
certain kind of talk: rational, contained, and oriented to a shared problem.  Where anti-
democrats have used the standards of expertise, moderation, and communal orientation as a way 
to exclude average citizens from political decision-making, modern democrats seem to adopt 
these standards as guides for what democratic politics should be like.  And the exclusionary 
connotations of these standards persist.”   
 8
| 3 | SENSING 
 
n the morning of September 11, 2001 Astronaut Frank Culbertson and his two 
Russian colleagues in the International Space Station had just completed their 
physical exams when they learned of the attack on the World Trade Center.  As 
Culbertson wrote in a letter transmitted electronically later that day,  
 
“I glanced at the World Map on the computer to see where over the world we 
were and noticed that we were coming southeast out of Canada and would be 
passing over New England in a few minutes.  I zipped around the station until I 
found a window that would give me a view of NYC and grabbed the nearest 
camera. It happened to be a video camera… The smoke seemed to have an odd 
bloom to it at the base of the column that was streaming south of the city. After 
reading one of the news articles we just received, I believe we were looking at NY 
around the time of, or shortly after, the collapse of the second tower.” 
 
Culbertson’s video images of the plume of smoke streaming from the collapsed towers 
were later followed by photographs from IKONOS, the first high-resolution Earth            




imaging commercial satellite, as well as infrared images from the European Space 
Agency’s low-flying SPOT satellite and NASA’s Terra Satellite.6  Anyone in the world 
with an internet connection could use these satellite prostheses to “see” the Ground Zero 
site from hundreds of miles in space.  Cameras for government or corporate surveillance 
thus helped to create a kind of reverse panopticon: In place of Bentham’s architectural 
Panopticon where all prisoners were under surveillance from a central tower (Foucault 
1979) in the WTC case all eyes were trained on the ruins of two central towers.  The 
destruction of the commonplace had created a common ground.   
 
Civil engineer Guy Nordenson was much closer to the WTC than the Space Station 
astronauts.  His office is on Broadway only a block away from the site.  From his home 
on that day he began calling colleagues – engineers, emergency response specialists, and 
others in the earthquake engineering community.  Aware that the city’s emergency 
response headquarters had been destroyed with the WTC7 tower, Nordenson and his 
colleagues spontaneously began to assess the extent of damage to buildings in Lower 
Manhattan.  To do so they mobilized volunteer engineers through the Structural 
Engineers Association of New York (SEAoNY), and they started with resources close at 
hand.  Earlier in the year, for a study for the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) to model the effects a medium-sized earthquake might have on Manhattan, 
Nordenson’s team had created a database that described the structure of every building 
in Manhattan.  With that database in hand, the SEAoNY volunteers carried out a series 
of physical and virtual inspections using Global Positioning System technology, laser 
technology (known as LIDAR) with the capability of penetrating through the smoke to 
produce accurate elevation data, and thermal imagery for mapping hot spots in the 
rubble.  Geographical Information Systems (GIS) provided the tools for integrating, 
analyzing, and displaying these spatial data.  Within days, rather than weeks or months, 
they produced detailed mappings of the varying degrees of damage to buildings in Lower 
Manhattan. 
 
In order to make sense of the disaster and begin the process of sense-making about 
rebuilding, New Yorkers needed sensors.  Without waiting for centralized guidance, 
various specialists made their sensing tools available for public perception.  As we saw, 
the first reconnaissance missions focused on the urgent tasks of determining the scope 
and boundaries of destruction.  But almost immediately, reconnaissance also became a 
process of rediscovering the site.  If the aerial photographs and thermal imaging 
provided a mediated access making visible the invisible, many people surged to the site 
to see for themselves.  Despite the worldwide downturn in tourism after September 11, 
visitors started coming to New York in record numbers.  Ironically, within months after 
its opening, the viewing platform designed by four prominent New York architects 
attracted more out-of-town visitors than the 1.8 million visitors that the WTC formerly 
got on its observation deck each year (Lisle 2004).   
 
To help them see, our Columbia colleague, artist/architect Laura Kurgan, created a map, 
“Around Ground Zero: A map for walking in Lower Manhattan after September 11.”  
                                                 




Kurgan and her students watched visitors (even native New Yorkers) wandering lost 
around the site, asking policemen where they were allowed to walk, or crowding around 
small xeroxed copies of FEMA maps posted for construction workers.  They concluded 
that conventional street maps were of no help in providing orientation in the chaotic 
setting.  Researched and produced by volunteers, Kurgan’s map provided information 
about accessible streets and views, off-bound zones, suggested walking paths, memorial 
sites, and an inventory of damaged buildings.  Writing for New York New Visions, 
whose Temporary Memorial Committee sponsored the map, Kurgan noted: 
 
“The map serves at once as a practical guide to the site and as a memorial 
document.  Its aim is to help people make sense of what they are seeing, or, if that 
is asking too much, at least to measure their disorientation in the face of the 
unimaginable.  The site around what was the World Trade Center is manifestly 
disorienting, for obvious reasons, and it should be in a sense, but the map 
addresses the unnecessary disorientation and allows visitors to take stock of what 
has happened” (Kurgan 2002).7 
 
Inspired by artists who had produced a map of war-torn Sarajevo in 1996, the 18-by-24 
inch foldable map was updated three times, first in December 2001, and more than 
100,000 copies were distributed by volunteers at the site. As part of a pro-bono project, 
New York new media firm Razorfish launched an interactive website version of the map.  
With Flash technology a visitor can use a mouse to “roll over” areas of the map allowing 
multiple visual and political layers of the site to be exposed and entered.  
 
Satellite photographs, Nordenson’s GIS mappings, and Kurgan’s interactive tour are 
ways of seeing. New technologies thus facilitated a collective sensing. While lawyers 
argued about the conflicting property rights of the complex ownership and lease-holding 
structure of the site, New Yorkers engaged in a search for the properties of the site. In 
this exploration, they made collective discoveries about the characteristics, the features, 
the demography, the history, and the future possibilities of Lower Manhattan.  Among 
these many reconnaissance missions, we highlight the following: 
 
• With detailed drawings in the New York Times digital version, reconnaissance 
looked below to see that beneath the broken streets were miles of telephone cable, 
water mains, sewer pipes, subway tracks, and electrical lines.  
   
• Looking up, various groups posted information about environmental pollutants in 
the air over New York.  With data and interpretations independent of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, this reconnaissance essentially allowed New 
Yorkers to monitor the official monitors. 8    
 
• Looking over the site, a group of volunteer architects designed a viewing platform 
from which visitors could view the site. This physical platform was followed by 
                                                 
7 http://www.bu.edu/prc/6months/aroundgroundzero.htm 
 
8 911 Environmental Action (www.911ea.org;  New York Environmental Law and Justice 
Project (www.nyenvirolaw.org);  Asthma Moms (www.asthmamoms.com) 
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virtual viewing platforms – web-cams positioned atop buildings adjacent to the 
WTC recovery and reconstruction site.   
 
• Looking in, the Sonic Memorial Project website posted aural recordings of sounds 
from the World Trade Center.9  Academic research posted on an “After September 
11th” site by the Social Science Research Council looked behind the façade of the 
WTC, showing that it had been a virtual portal linking global trade in intangible 
derivatives and warning of the new problems of a financial district in an era when 
proximity is a function of bandwidth.10    
 
• Looking back, historians rediscovered an archeological record of the electronics 
merchants displaced by the WTC and before that a long-ago Arab market.   In 
virtual exhibits organized by the New York Historical Society and the Skyscraper 
Museum, New Yorkers learned of the role of the Rockefeller family, of Robert 
Moses, and of backroom deals in the story of the planning, design, and construction 
of the world’s tallest buildings for which it was often difficult to find non-subsidized, 
non-governmental agency tenants (Sorkin and Zukin 2002).  
 
• With maps on the websites of Rebuild Downtown Our Town (r.dot), a newly 
formed civic association, reconnaissance looked out to display the employment 
catchments basin that brought workers from New Jersey, Long Island, and 
Connecticut, illustrating the complexities of the Lower Manhattan transportation 
hub and showing the possibilities of restoring the former street grid that had been in 
place prior to the WTC’s construction in 1970.11    
 
• Looking across the 
political landscape, public 
radio station WNYC 
posted an interactive map 
of the power structure of 
the political field.  
Scrolling over the map, the 
user could identify network 
ties of director interlocks 
and other political alliances 
among key decision-





  Image 2.  Map of WTC site showing former street grid. Rebuild  
           Downtown Our Town.  
           Source:  www.rebuilddowntownourtown.org 






Public debate about projects such as that in Lower Manhattan is replete with discussions 
about “transparency.”  Typically, these refer to a desire that important decisions be made 
with full publicity, open to public view.  In these and other reconnaissance missions we 
see that transparency can have another moment.  The study of science and technology 
frequently refers to processes by which the socially constructed character of a given 
artifact or technology has receded out of view – it becomes “black boxed” (Latour 1987).  
In “opening the black box,” we become aware of possibilities that were incipient but not 
developed.  Crisis can create openings of the black box.  Cold and sleek on the skyline, 
whether we warmed to the twin towers or resisted their long shadows, they were part of 
the taken for granted.  Tragically, in ruins, they, their histories, and the histories and 
social dynamics of Lower Manhattan became more transparent.  In rediscovering the 
site, in re-knowing, indeed, re-cognizing the site, reconnaissance missions increasingly 
opened possibilities about what it might become.                   
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| 4 | SENSE-MAKING 
 
Assemblies of imagination 
ven while fires still smoldered in the WTC ruins, citizens joined together to begin 
the process of memorializing and rebuilding in Lower Manhattan.  Within weeks, 
literally dozens of civic associations were formed.  If you were an architect or an 
urban planner, it would be no exaggeration to say that you could attend a meeting every 
evening at some venue or another. In place of coordinating the energies of specialists, 
several newly formed civic organizations saw their mission as soliciting views from the 
general citizenry.  One of these, Imagine New York, convened more than 230 “imagine 
workshops” across the city.  Meeting in schools, places of worship, community centers, 
firehouses, and living rooms, they invited the public’s ideas and visions.  These face-to-
face meetings were augmented by an online submission form that made it easy to 
contribute an idea and/or image.  Posters and electronic announcements for the 
meetings emphasized: “Anyone -- regardless of artistic ability or any sort of training -- 
can participate in a workshop.” The meetings and website collected people’s ideas by 
addressing three questions:  “What have we lost? How have we changed? What should 
be done on the World Trade Center site, in your community, and in the tri-state region 





 Image 3.  Imagine workshop.  Photo credit: Imagine New York.  
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Imagine New York trained facilitators who wrote down citizens’ ideas on large sheets of 
butcher block paper.  These ideas were captured on digital cameras.  Altogether some  
19,000 statements were solicited from over 3000 meeting participants and 850 online 
submissions.13  Imagine New York then aggregated these 19,000 ideas into 49 “vision 
statements,” which they distributed to the press, presented to official agencies and other 
civic groups, and re-presented to the community participants on the website.  As a 
means of demonstrating that “we will make sure that your voice is heard,”  
 
“Imagine New York’s online Idea Gallery contains all of the ideas generated in 
workshops, submitted online, in the mail, and created on murals. We thank you 





















          Image 4. Imagine workshop. Photo credit: Imagine New York.   
 
 
Searchable by keyword, theme, or workshop location, as the Gallery emphasized, “You 
can locate your idea.”  Digitalization, therefore, not only facilitated collection and 
distribution of the citizens’ “visions.”  It also supported a simple accountability: a given 
participant could see that her idea had been posted. And while doing so, she could see 
the similar and differing ideas of others.  As the accompanying sidebar suggests, these 
ideas were thoughtful, playful, and extraordinarily heterogeneous.  Onto the WTC 




                                                 
13 See Kutz et al (2005) for a preliminary analysis of these statements using computer-assisted 
interpretation algorithms.             
.    
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Examples of some of the 19,000 statements gathered by Imagine New York 
 
Rebuild taller and more magnificent than before as a symbol of resilience. 
 
From now on we should listen to other countries problems and try to help so that they don't feel that America is a 
rich giant. 
 
More kids on more swings. 
 
It should be a place that everyone can go to. 
 
Life without trucks, barricades --  restore beauty and businesses 
 
I want the WTC to look big but not be so big, baby blue with yellow sprinkles. 
 
Try to maintain the sense of community that has flowered in the aftermath of 9/11. 
 
A neutral zone: no IDs, no paperwork. 
 
Use the money to create community centers so the kids can stay out of trouble. 
 
A universal United Nations community for people to sit, talk, and have coffee. 
 
Let go, but not forget. No made-for-TV movies, etc. about 9/11. 
 
We must find a way to celebrate what we’ve learned about each other and the city. 
 
In the museum, what makes war, and how everyone thinks that they're right. 
 
Global village--the UN for people, not diplomats. 
 
DO SOMETHING RADICAL so people come from all over to see the beautiful structure. 
 
I'd like to see affordable housing included. 
 
Think 'public good' rather than 'private greed' 
 
Reconnect WTC site to the world by tying it to the river, harbor, and ocean. 
 
A beautiful park is possible, with trees representing each country from which people came who lost their lives on 
9/11 and open spaces filled with native greenery -- a tribute to all life. We need to be part of nature and of the city 




Assemblies of deliberation 
Whereas Imagine New York deployed protocols and technologies not for deliberative 
purposes but for expressive practices, Listening to the City, an “electronic town meeting,” 
used a different set of protocols and technologies to assemble and explicitly deliberative 
forum.  Sponsored by the Civic Alliance in conjunction with the Lower Manhattan 
Development Corporation (LMDC) and the Port Authority, Listening to the City 
brought 4,500 people to the Javits Center for an all-day meeting on July 20, 2002 to 
review proposed plans for the WTC site and to deliberate more broadly about the 
redevelopment of the area.  The Civic Alliance had canvassed widely before the meeting, 
and subsequent analysis indicates that the participants were largely representative of the 




     
    Image 5.   Javits Center. Listening to the City.  July 20, 2002.   Photo credit: America Speaks.   
 
 
After arriving at the cavernous convention center, participants were dispersed, ten each 
to hundreds of round tables.  At these tables they introduced themselves, and facilitators 
guided discussion.  Participants at Listening to the City, thus, began by listening to each 
other. With keyboards hooked to a wireless local area network each table entered 
opinions, goals, and means. A central clearing house synthesized themes which were 
projected onto giant screens.  Using personal computerized keypads participants were 
then asked to indicate their priorities among these themes with polling results displayed 
on the large screens in an iterative process.  In a similar manner, participants also rated 
six proposals for redeveloping the WTC site. In overwhelming numbers they rejected 
each of the proposals. At the end of the day, each participant was given a print out 
including graphs of the demographics of the attendees and the polling outcomes.  
Shortly after the July 20th event, eight hundred people began two weeks of online 
discussion in a second phase of Listening to the City organized around similar themes 








































                    Image 7.  Listening to the City. Theme team processing electronically-transmitted  
                        input from discussion tables. Photo credit: America Speaks.   
                     
Widely publicized, the electronic town hall was decisive in discrediting the uninspiring 
plans sponsored by the Port Authority. In its wake, the LMDC seized the planning 
initiative.  Promising that it would be more responsive than the bureaucrats at the Port 
Authority, the LMDC invited a set of international star architects to submit proposals to 
its “Innovative Design” competition and sponsored a series of offline and online forums, 
viewings, and hearing through which it solicited public feedback.         
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| 5 | DEMONSTRATING 
 
lthough there were relatively few street rallies and over contentious events, the 
debate over the future of Lower Manhattan was not lacking in demonstrations.  
Like many of the important issues of our day, the political and the technical were 
intertwined in the matters of concern in the New York case.  Accordingly, the relevant 
demonstrations involved charts, graphs, and visualizations – indeed, a wide panoply of 
materials in which participants attempted to offer proofs of the validity of their claims.  
As our research proceeded, we realized that it was pointless to identify some 
demonstrations as “political” and others as “technical,” so entwined were the two in 
almost every instance.14   
                                
 
       Image 8.  In this digital rendering, architect Norman Foster demonstrates the viability of his  
        design for the memorial voids on the WTC footprints.   Credits:  Norman Foster Studio. 
                                                 
14  Science and technology studies has been fascinated by the similarities between the repertoires 
of science and politics (Latour 1987).  Most recently, Barry (2001) has shifted attention from 
processes of representation to practices of demonstration, highlighting the entanglement of the 
political and the technical.  For a concise but extraordinarily rich discussion of these issues see 




  Image 9.  Rafael Vinoly. Winter Garden, Innovative Design Finalists Presentation,   
                   December 18, 2002.   Photo credits: Lower Manhattan Development Corporation. 
 
 
Exemplary in this respect were the demonstrations of the architects.  The signature 
architects who participated in the Innovative Design competition, did not, of course, 
take to the streets.  But, in their own way, each was a kind of social movement 
attempting to mobilize popular opinion.  Starting with their Power Point presentations 
at the Winter Garden where they unveiled their plans in December 2002, the architects 
demonstrated. 
 
Each demonstrated that his project was inspired. See, for example, Daniel Libeskind’s 
energetic sketches or the shadow cast by Peter Eisenman’s crisscrossed hands as attempts 
to capture the unique moment of inspiration.  Using technical drawings and digital 
animations, they demonstrated that their buildings could be safely evacuated.  With 
digital renderings of their models placed on the Manhattan skyline or at a city 
streetscape, they demonstrated that their project would exist both on a monumental and 
a human scale (all but one architect showed his building with a child in the image) and 
that it could be projected far into a future from which New Yorkers would look back 
with nostalgia.   
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Image 10.  Daniel Liebeskind demonstrates moment of inspiration for WTC design. 
Credit:  Studio Liebeskind.   
 
 
                 Image 11. Peter Eisenman demonstrates moment of inspiration for WTC design. 
                 Credit: Eisenman Architects.     
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What better evidence that a building could exist than that it already did exist – as a 
postcard purchased by a tourist.  And so each Power Point presentation concluded with 
postcard images –“shot” from helicopters or from a ferry on a calm evening with the 
Statue of Liberty, the Brooklyn Bridge, or the moon nestled in front, nearby, or 
hovering over the virtual buildings.   
 
 




                  Image 13.  THINK Team. Shigeru Bon, Frederic Schwartz, Ken Smith, and  




Image 14. Peter Eisenman, Charles Gwathmey, Steven Holl, and Richard Meier, Digital rendering.   
 
 
On October 12, 2001 just a month after the WTC attack, people who lived and worked 
in Lower Manhattan engaged in a demonstration more typical of our conventional ideas 
of a social movement.  Hundreds of people, many wearing surgical masks, assembled not 
far from Ground Zero at Pace University to demand specific details about the types and 
levels of toxins in the air and in their residences and workplaces.  In press releases during 
that first month Christine Whitman, Administrator of the federal Environment 
Protection Agency (EPA), had reassured the public that there was no cause for health 
concerns.  Early statements referred to air quality: 
 
“EPA is greatly relieved to have learned that there appears to be no significant levels 
of asbestos dust in the air in New York City.” Governor Whitman, EPA press release 
9/13/01.  
 
“I am glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, DC that their air is 
safe to breathe and their water safe to drink.”  Whitman, 9/18/01       
 
Subsequent statements referred specifically to homes and workplaces: 
 
“New Yorkers and New Jersians need not be concerned about environmental issues 
as they return to their homes and workplaces.”  Whitman, 9/21/01 
 
“…no evidence of any significant public health hazard to residents, visitors or 
workers beyond the immediate World Trade Center area.”  Whitman, 10/3/01 (All 
quotations available at www.epa.gov/epahome/newsroom.htm)   
 
But the demonstrators at the October 3rd meeting told of their children coughing and 
wheezing and of other symptoms.  “All I know right now is that there are irritants.  
What are these things?” said one resident. “For some people, that meeting might have 
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been soothing, but I’m still thirsting for more information.”  (Newsday October 12, 
2001).    
 
Sadly, good information was not forthcoming from the EPA.  In fact, the early official 
statements that conditions were safe put the residents and office workers of Lower 
Manhattan in a terrible double bind.  Because the federal agency had declared that there 
was no health hazard, other agencies used these rulings as justifications for not making 
rigorous inspections inside homes and workplaces.  Yet it was precisely in these interiors 
that levels of contamination would be most dangerous when pulverized debris and toxic 
fibers were stirred up during cleanup.    
 
Over the course of the fall of 2001 and spring of 2002, numerous civic organizations 
mobilized to pressure government agencies to provide information on health conditions. 
These included 911 Environmental Action, AsthmaMoms, the WTC 
Community/Labor Coalition, the Lower East Side-Chinatown Consortium, and the 
Lower Manhattan Tenants Coalition.  Initial efforts were directed at demonstrating that 
the relevant agencies were engaged in a kind of jurisdictional non-accountability – each 
agency claiming that some other was responsible.15 As they strove to force accountability, 
residents and workers came to learn that they would have to acquire technical 
knowledge – for example, about the difference between long and short asbestos fibers, 
about the toxicity of dioxin, lead, arsenic, mercury, and other contaminants, and about 
established standards for schools and workplaces. At the meetings of local community 
groups, we heard discussions that were not only about how to prod elected officials but 
how to comprehend measurements at the micron level.16  Some groups focused on the 
unique conditions in which the towers had collapsed vertically on themselves. That 
tremendous force produced new forms of ultra-fine particle contaminants – e.g., cement 
dust pulverized to microscopic size or inordinate ratios of small to long asbestos fibers – 
in structures and at levels which had not been observed before.  In their demonstrations, 
the community groups provoked members of the “technical community” to 
acknowledge that on some matters there were no agreed upon standards because the 
types, levels, and combinations of contaminants were so unprecedented in the Lower 
Manhattan case.  
 
At the end of 2001, new and disturbing information became available to citizen groups.  
In their initial efforts to learn how to read and interpret technical reports, the local 
community had been assisted by experts at non-governmental organizations such as New 
York Committee on Occupational Safety and Health (NYCOSH) and the New York 
Environmental Law and Justice Project.  Now they found allies inside the government 
                                                 
15 See "EPA National Ombudsman First and Second Investigative Hearings on World Trade 
Center Hazardous Waste Contamination." Convened by Jerrold Nadler, Congressman; Robert 
Martin, EPA Ombudsman; Hugh Kaufman, EPA Ombudsman Chief Investigator in New York 
City, 2002. www.nyenvirolaw.org/PDF/ Transcript-EPA-OmbudsmanHearing-2-23-2002.pdf 
and www.nyenvirolaw.org/PDF/ Transcript-EPA-OmbudsmanHearing-3-11-2002.pdf. 
 
16  Technical materials posted on community organization websites were often more informative 
than those of official agencies.  See, for example, the Frequently Asked Questions section of 
ImmuneWeb 911 launched within weeks after 9/11 http://www.immuneweb.org/911/ .   
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agencies.  For example, in a memorandum of December 3, 2001, Cate Jenkins, an 
Environmental Scientist in the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response of the 
EPA systematically documented discrepancies between official press releases and internal 
information obtained by the EPA:  While Governor Whitman was reassuring the public 
based on outdoor air samples, scientists at the EPA were looking at reports of elevated 
levels of indoor contamination that greatly exceeded the agency’s own standards; 
similarly, the agency was recommending cleanup procedures that directly violated its 
own safety guidelines.  Later the Office of the Inspector General of the EPA issued a 
finding that the EPA’s blanket statements about air safety had not been based on 
sufficient data and analyses (EPA Office of the Inspector General 2003).  Meanwhile 
hearings conducted by the EPA’s Ombudsman concluded that the agency had abdicated 
        
 
        Image 15. Table of comparisons. 911 Environmental Action. Source:  www. 911ea.org   
 
 
its responsibility for monitoring indoor cleanup.17  Finally, the Sierra Club issued a 
major study systematically documenting instances where government agencies, including 
                                                 
17 "EPA has not fully discharged its duties under PDD (Presidential Directive) 62, the National 
Contingency Plan (NCP) and the 2001 OMB Annual Report to Congress on Combating 
Terrorism. EPA has abandoned its responsibilities for cleaning up buildings (both inside and 
out) that are contaminated, or that are being re-contaminated, as a result of the uncontrolled 
chemical releases from the WTC terrorist attack.” (Martin 2002).  
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the EPA, had misled the public (Sierra Club 2003).   Agencies responsible for public 
safety had not simply given poor information but had knowingly given the public 





            Image 16.  United States Enviornmental Protection Agency.    Source: www.epa.gov/wtc. 
 
 
With these technical findings the various civic organizations sought to demonstrate that 
the EPA was engaging in a cover-up.  Because the dominant print media fell into line 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.nycosh.org/environment_wtc/Ombudsman_Findings_WTC.pdf  After issuing his 
report, National Ombudsman, Robert Martin, was fired by the EPA. 
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with the EPA story (the NY Times, for example, ran no fewer than thirteen stories 
between September 12 and February 24, 2002 emphasizing the safety of the site) (Katz, 
2002), these demonstrations were made online.  Civic websites directed citizens’   
attention to reports that showed inconsistencies and falsehoods.18 Typical of these 
demonstrations were timelines or tables that juxtaposed what was known and what was 
said by federal administrators. 
 
With these demonstrations, civic organizations were able to fix the attention of elected 
officials to their grievances.  In spring of 2003, Senator Hilary Clinton threatened to 
block the nomination of Governor Whitman’s successor at the EPA.  In exchange for 
her vote, she secured public hearings by an expert panel to review the agency’s work and 
make recommendations for corrective action.  With the establishment of this panel, 
citizen groups were eligible for public funds to hire independent experts to monitor the 
monitors.  With vastly superior resources, the EPA launched a counter-demonstration 
on its own website in a public relations campaign designed to convey that it was, after 
all, a caring public agency.  




ur overview of the deliberations and demonstrations in rebuilding Lower 
Manhattan is doubly inconclusive.  First, this essay outlines an analytic strategy 
and is too brief to examine the topic in depth.  Second, the rebuilding of Lower 
Manhattan is still very much a work in progress.  Although architects have been chosen 
for the Trade Center site, the memorial, and the transit hub, there is much dispute 
about the overall design.  Moreover, as we saw, the public’s involvement has been less 
about this or that architectural design than over the use of the site and its relationship to 
neighboring districts and the city as a whole.  Many, indeed most, of these issues remain 
unsettled.19      
 
What has been learned?  New Yorkers demonstrated that civic participation can be 
revitalized and that new technologies can be an important resource in organizing that 
participation.  New civic associations were mobilized and existing ones were repurposed.  
The Municipal Art Society spun off Imagine New York, the American Institute of 
Architects sponsored New York New Visions, the Regional Planning Association 
provided leadership in forming the Civic Alliance, and professional networks coalesced 
into more formalized, albeit temporary, organizations.  In these and other assemblies, 
tens of thousands of lay citizens actively participated in the extended processes of 
collective sense-making.  In nearly every case, websites, list-serves, and other digital 
technologies were critical in mobilizing energies, providing information, and supporting 
collaborative, interpretive work.  Aware that the interest of lay citizens and engaged 
professionals might wane as the sense of immediacy diminishes, dozens of civic 
organizations formed a new umbrella, New York 2050, to debate the city’s future as a 
lasting legacy to the democratic momentum forged after 9/11.   Thus, the most 
important consequences might lie in yet another stage of sense-making when citizens 
reflect back on the process and draw conclusions about the limitations of their own 
experiments.   
 
The information government paradigm as applied to the case of post 9/11 New York, 
highlights how new technologies were less important in facilitating intra-governmental 
coordination than in fostering the generation of information at a vast number of sites 
and the circulation of this information among citizens themselves.  However, we would 
emphasize of even greater significance the interpretative dimension of information 
government.  In our era, information abounds.  Faced with a deluge of information, a 
multiplicity of evaluative principles, and myriad features that could be potentially 
salient, what is taken into account?   What counts?  To that challenge, New Yorkers 
deployed new technologies not only to increase the flow of information among a greater 
number of nodes but to build communities of interpretation.   
 
As a large and amorphous project ecology, civic engagement in the New York case shares 
an important challenge with other “project” forms: given that projects are, by definition 
                                                 
19 Nonetheless, the collaborative sense-making that we described did have consequences by 
establishing success criteria:  an outcome can be judged to fail if it does not harmonize 
commercialization, memorialization, cultural institutions, and new residential development. 
O 
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temporary, how is the knowledge that is gained from one project made available to 
future projects?   This problem is especially acute in the digital era.  As our own research 
indicates, many of the websites and other digital formats from which we collected data 
are no longer in operation and, therefore, that particular knowledge base is no longer 
accessible to citizens.  If public officials are to be held accountable, the public needs 
access to records of its own accountings.  How will libraries, museums, and universities 
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